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SANCTIONING CORPORATIONS 
Meir Dan-Cohen* 
I. REFORMULATING THE QUESTION 
The question this symposium invites us to discuss, ought 
collective entities be criminally punished, arises in the intersection 
between two sets of issues, ontological and normative. In order to 
address this question, we must form some conception of what 
collective entities are; this is the ontological challenge. And we 
must form a conception of just or appropriate punishment; this is 
the normative challenge. We would probably not be here today if 
there were agreement on either of these matters, let alone if there 
were agreement on both. In fact, there is none. The question we 
address, though broadly discussed, remains highly contested. But 
though the question receives conflicting answers, there is one point 
of tacit agreement: that the question is properly posed. The very 
disagreement as to whether collectivities should be criminally 
punished attests to a shared premise that this question sets the 
correct scholarly agenda, and that a positive or negative answer is 
the desired goal. My starting point in this paper is to question the 
question. By presenting us with a binary option this question forces 
upon us a false dilemma that distorts the debate and induces 
unwarranted, sometimes paradoxical consequences. Refusing the 
question is the first step toward escaping the dilemma and 
rectifying the terms of the debate to which it gives rise. 
Though the question in question concerns collectivities in 
general, like other participants in this symposium I focus for the 
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most part on just one type of collectivity: the large corporation.1 
(For the sake of brevity, from now on I omit the adjective.) This 
selectivity is not adventitious. First, corporations form a 
particularly salient and significant group of collective entities. 
Secondly, they share some characteristics that make them a 
distinctive and relatively homogenous type of collectivity. 
Corporations are formal and instrumental collectivities. Formal, in 
the sense that they have an elaborate and relatively well-defined 
organizational structure, and instrumental in the sense that their 
creation and maintenance is oriented toward the accomplishment 
of certain goals seen as providing the corporation with legitimacy 
and a raison d’être.2 My comments can be extended, with caution 
and necessary adjustments, to various other collectivities that 
resemble corporations in relevant respects. But though the 
following discussion may thus have wider implications, I consider 
directly only the narrower version of the question: should 
corporations be criminally punished? For ease of reference I label 
this the Question. 
A. Two Assumptions  
Two tacit assumptions regarding criminal punishment underlie 
the Question: that such punishment is, first, a unitary category 
which, secondly, derives its meaning from a paradigm case 
involving individual offenders. Call these, respectively, the 
assumption of unity and the assumption of individuality. The first 
assumption is implicit in the single label used to designate the 
practice under consideration. Only if this label stands for a 
singular, unified practice, can the Question be meaningfully posed. 
The second assumption is implicit in the challenge that 
                                                          
1 This designation combines the strictly legal notion of incorporation, i.e., 
being the bearer of legal rights and obligations, with the sociological notion of 
an organization, which connotes structure and a certain level of complexity. 
2 I distinguish corporations from other collectivities, most significantly 
from communities, and draw some normative implications of the distinction in, 
for example, Between Selves and Collectivities: Toward a Jurisprudence of 
Identity, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1213, 1216, 1232, 1239–40 (1994), and Freedoms of 
Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by Organizations, 
Communities, and the State, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1229, 1230–31, 1244–58 (1991). 
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collectivities supposedly present in this regard: punishing 
corporations is perceived as extending a practice whose natural 
domain is populated by individuals. 
It is easy to see how these assumptions shape the debate. The 
first defines its conceptual contours. Whether or not to punish 
corporations is presented as a package-deal; we are asked to cast a 
yes-or-no vote, as it were, on a single option, that of subjecting 
corporations to an existing regime of criminal justice. The second 
assumption dictates the normative tenor of the discussion: in order 
to be punishable, corporations must be assimilated in one way or 
another to the paradigmatic individual offenders, and so the 
normative considerations and concerns that bear on punishing 
corporations turn out to be those that bear on punishing 
individuals. In light of these two assumptions, the dilemma to 
which I alluded is clear: punishing corporations requires forcing 
them, conceptually as well as normatively, into a pre-existing 
Procrustean bed designed to accommodate a different type of 
inhabitant; yet to refrain from punishing them is to exempt some 
powerful agents, capable of great social harm, from a significant 
instrument of social control.  
 The Assumption of Unity 
When made explicit, both assumptions look shaky, and ways of 
loosening their grip appear. Consider the assumption of unity first. 
Criminal punishment consists of a variegated cluster of ideas and a 
complex institutional structure. It is not made of whole cloth. 
Nevertheless, treating it, with the aid of a single label, as an 
undifferentiated unit, has great practical as well as intellectual 
merit. Thinking, no less than practice, hinges on such composites 
whose unity is for the most part taken for granted. Yet depending 
on the goals we pursue or the nature of the investigation we 
conduct, it is sometimes advisable to disaggregate a given 
composite and refine the analysis by attending more closely to the 
composite’s components. The legal treatment of corporations is a 
sufficiently fundamental matter to call for such an approach. 
Simply too much is at stake in this area for us to ignore the 
heterogeneity and complexity of what criminal punishment 
designates.  
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Once we look at criminal punishment even through the feeblest 
magnifying glass and subject it to the dullest scalpel, many 
disparate elements spring into view and can be pried apart. 
Criminal punishment is a form of centralized social control that 
employs coercion, is initiated by the state, is rule-bound, is 
judicially administered, and so forth. Each of these elements can be 
in turn further unpacked: there is no algorithm for delimiting in 
advance the level of detail that would best serve in a thorough 
investigation of the kind the Question calls for. Judgment is 
required to decide how fine grained our approach ought to be. The 
Question, however, avoids such a judgment by hiding the 
multiplicity of issues and options that arise in this area under the 
terminological rug it blithely throws over them. When we peer 
under the rug or remove it entirely, we are in a better position to 
pick and choose among various elements in an effort to best adapt 
the practice of punishment as designed for individual offenders to 
the properties of the collectivities concerned.  
 The Assumption of Individuality 
The effort to adjust criminal punishment to a corporate context 
is also hampered by the second assumption underlying the 
Question, the assumption of individuality. Conceiving of 
individuals as the paradigmatic criminal offenders implies an 
obvious criterion in light of which the Question must be answered: 
corporations are punishable if and only if punishing them would 
amount to or be the equivalent of punishing individual human 
beings. There are two ways in which this criterion can be satisfied 
in principle, and they correspond to the two main schools of 
thought regarding the nature of collectivities, the holistic and the 
reductionist. Roughly speaking, those I call holists affirm the 
existence of collective entities over and above, as the saying goes, 
their individual members.3 Reductionists, by contrast, maintain that 
                                                          
3 Holism, as used here, refers to a very large umbrella, under which a 
heterogeneous range of views congregate. As an indication of this range, it may 
be helpful to divide these views into three subcategories—call them the 
notional, the epistemological, and the metaphysical—differing in the level of 
“robustness” of the existence they claim for corporations, or, put differently, in 
the size or nature of the gap they posit between individual members and the 
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to talk about collective entities is to use a shorthand or indulge in a 
fiction, and in either case is to designate nothing but the multitude 
of individual agents and their interactions. Though the holistic and 
the reductionist approaches to collectivities are, ontologically 
speaking, polar opposites, their normative implications can, 
perhaps somewhat surprisingly, converge. This is most likely to 
happen when the holistic approach assumes, sometimes 
unwittingly, an anthropomorphic mode. Whether the corporation is 
envisaged by the holist as an individual-like entity or by the 
reductionist as an aggregate of individuals, its legal treatment is 
assimilated to the treatment appropriate for individual human 
actors. 
The inquiry concerning the punishment of corporations 
accordingly assumes one of two forms. Seen from the holistic 
perspective, the question is whether the collectivity as a whole is 
similar enough to an individual agent so as to make the imposition 
of punishment appropriate. Seen from the reductionist perspective, 
the question is whether the individual members of the corporation 
stand to the criminal actions ascribed to the corporation in a 
relationship that legitimates punishing them. By moving the 
investigation along either of these lines, the question whether 
corporations ought to be criminally punished loads the dice in 
favor of a negative answer. For the holists, advocating corporate 
punishment requires that they identify in the corporation relevant 
human properties that permit analogizing it to an individual; such 
                                                          
corporation. A notional view highlights the fact that a reified conception of the 
corporation is deeply entrenched in our ordinary language and practices and 
proceeds to ascribe normative significance to such entrenchment. An 
epistemological view highlights the complexity of the network of relationships 
constitutive of the corporation, maintaining that this creates an insurmountable 
cognitive barrier for any attempt to account for the corporate phenomenon in 
individual terms. This leaves open the possibility that such reduction is possible 
“in principle.” The third, metaphysical view is distinguished by denying this last 
claim, insisting instead (on various and sometimes conflicting grounds) that 
corporations exhibit global properties that are not even in principle amenable to 
an individualist reduction. I ignore these distinctions for the most part, treating 
the holistic camp as unified, though a more thorough treatment of the issues 
involved would explore links between these subcategories and the specific 
arguments I make. 
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theorists risk committing the notorious anthropomorphic fallacy.4 
Reductionist advocates of corporate punishment find themselves 
on an equally treacherous path: they in effect favor the imposition 
of a form of collective punishment on a heterogeneous group of 
people many of whom do not satisfy the requirements of 
blameworthiness ordinarily required by criminal law. Attenuating 
these requirements in the present context seems both dangerous 
and ad hoc.  
B. Sanctions and Constraints 
In light of these daunting difficulties, it is no surprise that many 
theorists embrace the negative horn of the dilemma created by the 
Question, much as this position collides with a pre-theoretical 
reluctance to let corporations off the criminal hook.5 Others resist 
this conclusion, contriving instead an affirmative answer.6 
However, these theorists too have been led astray by the Question 
and fallen into what may be a less visible, but no less perilous, 
trap. By resolving the dilemma in favor of corporate punishment, 
these theorists are likely to view themselves as striking a blow 
against corporate power and its abuses; they fashion themselves 
                                                          
4 For illustrative discussions of warnings to this effect, see ROBERT B. 
REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF BUSINESS, DEMOCRACY, 
AND EVERYDAY LIFE 218–19 (2007); John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No 
Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate 
Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 n.2, 390, 441, 448 (1981). 
5 See, e.g., John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years 
of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329 (2009); Joseph F. 
Francis, Criminal Responsibility of the Corporation, 18 ILL. L. REV. 305, 314–
23 (1924); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it 
Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996); Eliezer Lederman, Criminal Law, 
Perpetrator and Corporation: Rethinking a Complex Triangle, 76 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 285 (1985); Manuel Velasquez, Debunking Corporate Moral 
Responsibility, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 531, 538–40 (2003); see also 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *476–77. 
6 See, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 833 (2000); Regina A. Robson, Crime 
and Punishment: Rehabilitating Retribution as a Justification of Organizational 
Criminal Liability, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 109 (2010); see also N.Y. Cent. & Hudson 
River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–96 (1909). 
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the black rather than the white knights of the corporate world. In 
fact, the blow they strike may have just the opposite effect.  
To see this paradoxical aspect of the present debate we must 
return to the first assumption underlying the Question, concerning 
the supposed unity of punishment. In contesting this assumption, I 
have distinguished a number of disparate factors in the practice of 
punishment. But for present purposes a binary division is all we 
need. The most prominent and indeed a defining element in the 
practice of criminal punishment is the sanction, by which I mean 
the use of coercive power to affect conduct. But the practice of 
punishment has an additional salient aspect: an unusually 
restrictive system of constraints—substantive, procedural, and 
evidentiary—to which the use of coercion is subject. The debate 
concerning the punishment of corporations focuses on the first 
element, the sanction, whereas the second element, the constraints, 
is mostly taken for granted, and so remains invisible. An 
affirmative answer to the Question accordingly involves not only a 
recommendation that corporations be liable to sanction, but also a 
further and usually undefended implication that once the state 
imposes sanctions on a corporation, it is bound by the same 
network of constraints that tie its hands when punishing 
individuals.7 
Once we depart from the unitary notion of criminal 
punishment, and, specifically, distinguish between sanctions and 
constraints, the Question whether corporations ought to be 
criminally punished becomes bifurcated. First, ought corporations 
be sanctioned, that is subject to the coercive enforcement of 
criminal norms? Second, ought the sanctioning of corporations be 
bound by criminal law’s strict constraints? In the next section I 
argue for an affirmative answer to the first question, and in the 
following section, for a negative answer to the second. In the final 
section I sketch some further implications of the view I advocate.  
                                                          
7 With occasional exceptions; see, e.g., Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 
206 (1988) (privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to corporations). 
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II. IN FAVOR OF SANCTIONS 
A. A Theory of Punishment 
The two questions just distinguished can only be pursued in 
light of the answers we give to more preliminary ones that reach to 
the fundamentals of criminal law theory: Why does the criminal 
law impose sanctions? Why does it employ constraints? Though 
this is a highly contested area, I will proceed with an approach to 
punishment that enjoys considerable support. The justification of 
punishment on this account is an interplay between deterrence and 
retribution, and correspondingly, between a consequentialist, 
mostly utilitarian strand, and a deontological, mostly Kantian 
strand, each respectively answering one of the preliminary 
questions. According to this familiar story, criminal law’s coercive 
threats are designed to promote some social goals or values. But 
these goals and values set necessary but insufficient conditions for 
imposing punishment. The reason is that we can imagine situations 
in which punishment would serve its legitimating purposes when 
imposed on someone who is innocent of any wrongdoing,8 and yet 
punishing the innocent even in those situations would be a moral 
outrage. But why? Seen in consequentialist terms, the answer is far 
from obvious; the opposition to punishing the innocent rests more 
securely on broadly Kantian grounds. Punishing the innocent, even 
in the service of some desirable goals, amounts to treating an 
individual as a means rather than as an end, in violation of the 
Categorical Imperative, and so is offensive to human dignity.9 The 
retributive aspect of punishment ensures that punishment be 
limited to the blameworthy, thereby adding a necessary moral 
permission to the consequentialist reasons that support coercion in 
                                                          
8 This could be the case, for example, when punishment is imposed on the 
wrong person by mistake, or through deliberate framing. In either case, the 
deterrent efficacy of the sanction remains undiminished as long as people 
believe in the defendant’s guilt. 
9 In the formulation most relevant here, the Categorical Imperative states: 
“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person 
or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same 
time as an end.” IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF 
MORALS 91 (H. J. Paton trans., 1948). 
 Sanctioning Corporations 23 
the first place.10 
To be sure, the line between the two sets of reasons that bear 
on punishment—deterrence-related consequentialist goals and 
retribution-related deontological side-constraints—is not well-
defined. The constraints consist primarily in the various elements 
of blameworthiness which substantive criminal law requires, and 
which evidentiary and procedural standards help safeguard. 
However, some level of wrongdoing, and thus arguably some form 
of blameworthiness, is implicit in the imperative of deterrence 
itself: random sanctions would make for a poor deterrent. The 
imperatives of deterrence therefore link sanctions to wrongdoing in 
ways that resemble the retributive side-constraints. But although 
the line between such “internal” limitations on sanctions on the one 
side and their extraneous, deontological constraints on the other is 
blurred, it is not obliterated, for two reasons. First, deterrence only 
requires an attenuated level of wrongdoing, arguably to the point 
of altogether dispensing with the subjective elements of crime, and 
correlatively with most of criminal law’s defenses.11 Consequently, 
much, if not quite all, of what substantive criminal law demands by 
way of blameworthiness must be explained by appeal to 
                                                          
10 This account is sometimes referred to as the mixed or hybrid theory of 
punishment. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justification, 118 
ETHICS 258, 258–59 (2008). An early, classical version is H. L. A. Hart, 
Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in 60 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 1 (1959–60). See also JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. 
COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 117–24 
(rev. ed., Westview Press 1990) (1984). Seen in this way, punishment is a 
special case of what has become a pervasive liberal template, in which the 
normative test for various institutions and practices combines consequentialist 
and deontological elements: consequentialist considerations define the goal of 
the institution or the practice, but the pursuit of this goal is subject to 
deontological side-constraints, designed to safeguard individuals and their rights 
from being unjustly sacrificed on society’s altar. The canonical texts are 
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977), especially chapters 4, 7, 
and 12, and ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26–53 (1974). For 
an illuminating overview, see SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF 
CONSEQUENTIALISM (rev. ed. 1994) (1982). For a book-length study of the 
application of this template to various areas of law, see EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK 
MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS, AND MORALITY (2010). 
11 See, e.g., Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 
12 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1960). 
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considerations that go beyond the imperatives of deterrence and so 
amounts to external constraints. Second, evincing a heightened 
anxiety lest an innocent defendant be punished, the evidentiary and 
procedural strictures of the criminal trial amplify and fortify these 
substantive constraints by erecting on the road to conviction some 
formidable obstacles which exceed what pure consequentialist 
considerations would mandate.12 
B. Practical Personality 
How does this account of criminal punishment bear on 
corporations? It will facilitate the discussion if at the outset we 
distinguish between, on the one hand, the conditions an entity must 
satisfy to be a proper object of the consequentialist considerations 
that buttress sanctions, and on the other, the conditions for it to be 
an object of the deontological concerns that buttress the side-
constraints. To mark the distinction, I’ll associate the former 
conditions with the possession of what I call practical personality, 
and the latter with the possession of moral personality. The 
distinction as drawn at this point is purely formal; it does not 
prejudice the inquiry as to what is the relationship between the two 
sets of conditions. Some writers in effect maintain that they 
overlap, or that one entails the other.13 I argue that they do not. 
The notion of practical personality is designed to answer the 
question of whether applying sanctions to an entity makes sense. 
Specifically, it spells out the preconditions for using coercive 
power as a measure of control with respect to corporations. For 
                                                          
12 See, e.g., Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1, 27 (1964) (“[People] have to be prepared to pay a price for a 
regime that fosters personal privacy and champions the dignity and inviolability 
of the individual. That price inevitably involves some sacrifice in efficiency 
. . . .”); see also Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal 
Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 
185, 201–02 (1983) (noting the value of Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections 
apart from their contributions to producing efficient and accurate results in 
criminal trials); Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process: Toward a More 
Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 117–25 
(1978) (finding the dignity of the individual to be a basic value underlying the 
due process required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
13 See sources cited infra note 25. 
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such measures to be potentially effective, and so for the imposition 
of sanctions on the corporation to be sound, it must be possible to 
ascribe to the corporation as a whole, that is at a global, non-
distributive level, (1) patterns of behavior and consequences, (2) 
that are amenable to change by means of the coercive measures 
employed. This in turn requires that we be able to ascribe to the 
corporation causal efficacy, displayed in such performances as 
manufacturing widgets or polluting the environment, as well as 
some cognitive faculties. These faculties must include some form 
of instrumental rationality, manifested as much in the harnessing of 
the corporation’s causal powers to the pursuit of some goals, as in 
responsiveness to norms and to threats that back them up. For such 
threats to have a bite, all that is required in turn is that they involve 
representations of actions designed to thwart in one way or another 
the corporation’s pursuit of its guiding goals, and so be perceived 
as a setback to what can be labeled the corporation’s interests.   
It is at least plausible to maintain that corporations display 
practical personality in this sense. Our ordinary ways of talking 
about corporations and a host of practices and attitudes regarding 
corporations take some such picture for granted. These ways of 
talking, practices, and attitudes find support in the kinds of 
considerations put forward by more systematic and reflective 
accounts of corporations within organization theory broadly 
conceived. Though this is not the place to canvass this extensive 
literature, its gist as it bears on the issue at hand can be briefly 
indicated.   
Organization theorists characterize formal organizations most 
frequently by the presence of a decision-making process. The idea 
of decision making implies the capacity to perform such functions 
as gathering, registering, recording, decoding, and disseminating 
information. These information-related functions are generally 
imputed to the organization, rather than to specific individuals, 
because the total information that leads to a certain decision, 
action, or product is not normally possessed by any single 
individual, nor is it just the combined knowledge possessed by a 
number of identifiable individuals. Instead, what information is 
gathered, to whom it is disseminated, how it is decoded, and how it 
is combined and brought to bear on the final outcome critically 
depend on the structure of the organization, on the presence or 
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absence of particular units or positions in it, and on the relevant 
standard operating procedures.14 Furthermore, in speaking of an 
organizational decision we presuppose the existence of some 
organizational preferences, which lend a certain unity and 
intelligibility to the pattern of events we think of as corporate 
behavior. Here, too, it is sensible to impute preferences to the 
organization itself, since its decisions need not be a direct 
reflection of any underlying pattern of individual preferences. For 
example, a coalition view depicts organizational decision making 
as a bargaining process among various groups with divergent and 
often conflicting interests. Decisions are accordingly characterized 
as the “political resultants”15 of these complex bargains, achieved 
in part by logrolling and strategic behavior. Social choice theory 
articulates more generally the obstacles, both practical and 
conceptual, to aggregating individual preferences into a col-
lectively rational choice.16 Portraying organizations as “intentional 
systems”17 possessed of “organizational intelligence”18 are cogent 
ways of expressing the view that organizations make decisions 
                                                          
14 See, for example, ROBERT H. BONCZEK, CLYDE W. HOLSAPPLE & 
ANDREW B. WHINSTON, FOUNDATIONS OF DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS (1981), 
for the role and nature of information processing in organizations. 
15 See GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE 
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 162 (1971): 
[R]esultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution 
to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and 
confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence; 
political in the sense that the activity from which decisions and actions 
emerge is best characterized as bargaining along regularized channels 
among individual members of the [organization]. 
16 See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 
3–4 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2d ed. 1963) (1951); R. DUNCAN LUCE & 
HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 327–70 (1957); THOMAS SCHELLING, 
MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978). See Philip Pettit, Responsibility 
Incorporated, 117 ETHICS 171, 180–84 (2007), for a recent version of this line 
of reasoning applied to the question of corporate personality. 
17 See Daniel Dennett, Conditions of Personhood, in BRAINSTORMS: 
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON MIND AND PSYCHOLOGY 267, 271 (1978) (defining 
intentional systems as systems or organisms whose behavior can be explained 
by reference to beliefs, desires, and intentions). 
18 See HAROLD L. WILENSKY, ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: 
KNOWLEDGE AND POLICY IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY (1967). 
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infused with cognitive content, that are the product of widely 
dispersed informational sources and diffuse individual interests 
and attitudes, all mediated by structures, processes, and chance, in 
ways that defy translating or tracing the organizational decision 
into its individual sources. By thus spelling out the grounds for 
imputing global properties to organizations, the considerations I 
have sketched serve to reassure us that the ordinary reifying 
language we commonly apply to organizations need not depend on 
a metaphorical personification nor on some far-reaching 
metaphysical commitments. The position these considerations 
support can be instead summarized as holding that whereas a 
corporation is constituted by a bunch of individuals, it is not 
identical with them, since constitution, in this case, is not 
identity.19 
C. Why Sanction  
The notion of practical personality is designed to capture 
conditions that support sanctioning an entity exhibiting it. Thus the 
case just made for ascribing practical personality to corporations is 
ipso facto also a case for subjecting them to sanctions. Even so, 
and in light of the pervasiveness of a contrary view, it may be 
helpful to spell out the link between the corporation’s practical 
personality and the argument for sanctions a bit more fully. This 
link consists in two complementary claims: that sanctioning 
corporations is potentially needed and that it is potentially 
efficacious. Both the need and the efficacy depend on a dual 
distinction, implicit in the notion of practical personality, between, 
first, distributive and non-distributive corporate acts, and 
correspondingly, between distributive and non-distributive effects 
on the corporation.  
                                                          
19 The difference between constitution and identity is most commonly 
illustrated by the alleged difference between a clay statue and the lump of clay 
of which it is made: for example, the statue can be destroyed without the lump 
of clay being destroyed. For a discussion of some of the issues involved in 
regard to the identity of material objects, see generally Lynne Rudder Baker, 
Why Constitution is Not Identity, 94 J. PHIL. 599 (1997). It probably goes 
without saying that this doctrine is contested in the case of material objects no 
less than in the case of corporations to which I extend it. 
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By distributive acts I mean acts which, though ascribed to the 
corporation, are performed by some identifiable individuals; non-
distributive acts are corporate acts which are not traceable or 
reducible to the acts of particular individuals. The word 
“identifiable” and the equivocation between traceable and 
reducible signify a difference between a weaker and a stronger 
interpretation of non-distributive acts. The stronger interpretation 
denies that a corporation’s manufacturing widgets, or for that 
matter, polluting the environment, can in all cases be accounted for 
in terms of individual actions even in principle. The weaker 
interpretation points to the complexity and opacity of the 
corporation as posing a practical obstacle to tracing corporate acts 
to their individual constituents, rendering such tracing too costly or 
otherwise impracticable even if possible in theory.20 Similar 
remarks apply to the effects of actions putatively directed toward 
the corporation. Such actions will have distributive effects when 
the effects are traceable or reducible to some particular individuals, 
and non-distributive effects otherwise.   
Non-distributive corporate acts indicate the need for 
enforcement measures addressed to the corporation, since they 
reveal a gap between controlling through punishment the conduct 
of particular individuals on the one hand, and a modification of the 
corporation’s conduct on the other. Without sanctioning the 
corporation, we face therefore an accountability and enforcement 
deficit. But this is only half the case for sanctioning corporations. 
The fact that there is a gap does not mean that ways of filling it 
exist, and in particular that corporate sanctions would avail. The 
other half of the argument accordingly concerns the likely efficacy 
of imposing sanctions on the corporation.  
Here the notion of non-distributive effects comes into play. 
Corporate sanctions are distinguished precisely by the fact that 
they are intended to have negative effects on the corporation as 
such, rather than on any particular individuals. How are such non-
distributive effects on the corporation likely to modify its conduct? 
In answering this question, it is helpful to distinguish three 
mechanisms of control that can be subsumed under the general 
heading of deterrence. I will call them respectively direct 
                                                          
20 See supra note 3. 
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deterrence, indirect deterrence, and mediated deterrence. Direct 
deterrence designates the most common, garden-variety form of 
deterrence in which the sanction is designed to influence the 
decisions and so directly modify the conduct of its intended object; 
the target of the sanction21 and the object of control coincide. In 
the two other forms of control, these diverge. Indirect deterrence 
occurs when, due to some special relationship between the target 
of sanction and the object of control, addressing a sanction to the 
one will influence the decisions of the other; for example, when the 
abduction of a politician by a radical group is designed to put 
pressure on the government, not on the captured politician. In 
mediated deterrence, the target of the sanction holds a position of 
power over the object of control or is otherwise able to modify the 
latter’s behavior. Here, the sanction is intended to impact its 
immediate target, but only so as to induce actions that will in turn 
influence the ultimate object of control, such as when holding 
parents responsible for the misdeeds of their children is intended to 
induce parental control over the children’s behavior.  
Evidently, all three mechanisms of control have a grip in the 
case of corporations and can be expected to exert influence on their 
performance. Sanctioning the corporation involves direct 
deterrence when we envisage the sanction, in impersonal terms, as 
a “disturbing event” in the corporation’s environment which serves 
to alert its decision making process to the existence of a certain 
dysfunction, triggering some standard operating procedure into 
taking remedial action consisting in some structural or systemic 
changes like modifying the communication network, introducing 
hitherto non-existent operations, etc.22 
Additionally, and despite the non-distributive effects of 
corporate sanctions, both indirect and mediated deterrence provide 
viable strategies for influencing some (unidentified) individuals as 
a way of affecting corporate behavior. Indirect deterrence takes 
place when, whether out of loyalty or self-interest, members of the 
corporation respond to the harm to the corporation represented by 
                                                          
21 This refers to the entity to which the threat of sanction is directed and on 
which the sanction is actually imposed in case of breach. 
22 This description draws particularly on the depiction of organizational 
behavior in RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY 
OF THE FIRM (2d ed., Blackwell Publ’g Inc. 1992) (1963).  
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sanctions. Their response may amount to or bring about a change 
in the corporation’s behavior. Mediated deterrence reverses this 
direction of influence, which in this case runs from the corporation 
to its individual members. A corporation may react to sanctions by 
seeking to identify responsible individuals and take remedial action 
addressed to them.23 
III. AGAINST CONSTRAINTS  
A. No Moral Personality 
But if corporations have practical personality, and so are 
amenable to sanctions, do they not have moral personality as well? 
The notion of moral personality as I use it here is specifically 
designed to capture the conditions by virtue of which the 
imposition of sanction ought to be subject to the criminal law’s 
battery of constraints. On the conception of criminal punishment I 
have adumbrated, these constraints protect human dignity. To ask 
whether corporations have moral personality is accordingly to 
inquire whether the idea of human dignity extends to them. 
Though when posed in this way the question may seem absurd, a 
rather straightforward line of reasoning would seem to lead to a 
positive answer. And though no one I know defends explicitly 
ascribing dignity to corporations,24 some writers come close. 
Following a vaguely Kantian line, they assume that the kinds of 
properties I associate with practical personality—a capacity for 
unified action and for rational decision making—constitute 
people’s moral personality as well. Once it is realized that 
corporations display these properties, they too must be recognized 
                                                          
23 This mechanism of deterrence is particularly emphasized in BRENT FISSE 
& JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY 32–34 
(1993). 
24 With perhaps one prominent exception, Jeremy Waldron, who has 
recently advocated ascribing dignity to collectivities of various kinds. See 
Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Groups, 2008 ACTA JURIDICA 66, 74–90 
(2008). But I am not sure that even he means to include business corporations. 
At any rate, his concept of dignity derives from the notion of high social rank, 
and so is quite different from the Kantian notion of dignity on which I rely. 
 Sanctioning Corporations 31 
as moral persons.25 Those who pursue this line of reasoning are 
often concerned with securing a basis for holding corporations 
responsible for harms they inflict, but the implicit result is to credit 
them with dignity as well, thus unwittingly extending to them the 
cluster of rights and protections that this idea entails.26 Can we do 
better than that? Can we deny corporations the supreme moral 
worth that the idea of dignity designates, while holding them 
answerable for harmful acts? To explore this possibility we need 
take a closer look at the relationship between practical and moral 
personality. Does the one entail the other? 
The negative answer I urge tackles what may appear as the 
most innocuous link in the chain of reasoning just outlined. It is an 
assumption not primarily about the ascription of moral personality 
to corporations, but more basically about the moral personality of 
human beings, to whom corporations are in turn compared. 
According to this assumption, unless the ascription to human 
beings of supreme moral worth is grounded in a suitable list of 
abstractly conceived characteristics, such ascription must be 
deemed arbitrary and self-serving, betraying merely a “traditional 
prejudice in favor of biological persons.”27 From this it seems to 
follow that in order to provide human dignity with the supposedly 
requisite foundation, we must start by composing a list of 
characteristics that would provide rational support for attributing 
dignity to their bearers. The items I subsumed under the label of 
practical personality are plausible candidates for such a list. The 
crunch, however, is that once we follow this strategy and compose 
a schedule of dignity-conferring traits, it becomes an open question 
of fact which entities display these traits and answer to the 
                                                          
25 For widely ranging variants of this theme, see, for example, T. Ozar, The 
Moral Responsibility of Corporations, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH 294, 294–99 (Thomas Donaldson & Patricia 
Werhane eds., 1979), Thomas Donaldson, Moral Agency and Corporations, 10 
PHIL. IN CONTEXT 54 (1980), Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral 
Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207 (1979), and Pettit, supra note 16. 
26 For a similar caveat, see Manuel G. Velasquez, Why Corporations are 
not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do, 2 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS 1, 1–18 
(1983). 
27 PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 34 
(1984). 
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description they constitute. Individual human beings by and large 
turn out to qualify (though some may not!), but in principle so can 
other entities, corporations included. 
This line of reasoning, common though it is, has things in 
reverse. Practical personality, as I use this notion, is indeed a 
descriptive category. Whether an entity possesses it can be 
established by observation and study, even if what is being 
observed and studied is at bottom a cluster of human practices, 
discursive or otherwise. Ascribing to people moral personality, i.e., 
an unconditional and inviolable worth, is an altogether different 
idea. For those who adhere to it, it defines the core of their 
humanism and serves as their most fundamental normative 
premise; it is not the conclusion of a train of reasoning but its 
starting point. And insofar as human dignity is seen as the 
cornerstone or starting point of a normative system, it cannot be 
read off, and in this sense grounded in, a configuration of empirical 
facts. The moral worth of human beings is immune to an 
investigation into which entities possess some abstractly conceived 
dignity-conferring traits, since it is not in the first place the product 
of such an investigation. By the same token, it is not an open 
question whether entities other than human beings may be found to 
possess these traits. In particular, it is not as though staring long 
and hard at corporations and studying them with care might reveal 
them to have the supreme moral worth with which at least a liberal 
creed invests individual human beings.28 This kind of 
anthropomorphic fallacy would not be just a factual error, but 
would involve a category mistake.29 
                                                          
28 Would intelligent Martians be potentially endowed with dignity? In 
contemplating such hypothetical possibilities, we imagine the Martians to be in 
effect human. What exactly “in effect” amounts to, however, need not be spelled 
out before the Martians land, and as long as human beings are the only 
candidates for moral personhood as here understood.  
29 Category mistakes occur when a person “represents the facts of mental 
life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or 
categories), when they actually belong to another.” GILBERT RYLE, THE 
CONCEPT OF MIND 16 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2000) (1949). The risk of 
committing the fallacy in the present context is vividly conveyed in the title, 
though not the content, of Susanna Kim Ripken’s article, Corporations Are 
People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the Corporate Personhood 
Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97 (2009). 
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The mistake against which I inveigh is often committed in 
Kant’s own name. Doesn’t he hold that moral personality, and so 
dignity, issue from a capacity for autonomy, one that closely 
resembles practical personality as I use the term? And isn’t this 
capacity an empirical trait, that some creatures display and others 
lack? We are of course not bound to follow Kant every step of the 
way, but it is important to raise a red flag against common 
aberrations that result from following him only part of it. In 
holding that autonomy grounds dignity, we should be careful to 
distinguish autonomy in Kant’s own transcendental sense, from an 
empirical sense in which autonomy designates some observable 
human psychological capabilities, which though supposedly more 
advanced and sophisticated, are nonetheless of the same kind as 
those displayed by many other creatures, be it computers or 
giraffes.30 After all, one of the main points of the idiom of dignity 
as used by Kant is to deny that people’s value can be placed in the 
same metric as the value of anything else.31 The role of human 
beings in a Kantian axiology is not in the first place as the objects 
of valuation but as its subjects, as the creators and origins of value. 
This is a complex idea to which we cannot hope to do justice in 
this space, but the crux of the matter may perhaps be stated as 
follows. The most distinctive human accomplishment is the 
creation of a world: the projection of a system of categories or 
meanings within which facts become intelligible and evaluative 
judgments possible. People’s own supreme worth is not itself the 
product of this projection but its precondition. It is a necessary 
presupposition of the validity or objectivity that we claim for the 
normative orders we inhabit. This is the sense in which human 
beings are all the exclusive parties to a unitary and comprehensive 
system of meanings, members, in Kant’s uplifting imagery, in the 
“Kingdom of Ends.”32 
Once a system of categories, concepts, values and the like is in 
                                                          
30 See KANT, supra note 9. 
31 Though Kant does talk about a seemingly broader category, of rational 
beings, people are the only terrestrial beings it comprises. See id. 
32 See id. at 95. To be sure, the meanings are often contested, but crucially, 
the contestation is in principle always possible, underwritten by the unity and 
comprehensiveness of the system of meanings within which it takes place. 
Needless to say, Kant’s universalism is itself highly contested. 
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place, it makes room for, among many other things, human beings, 
seen as empirical objects of observation. And as the observation of 
human beings reveals, they do generally display the kinds of traits 
I’ve associated with the notion of practical personality, and so are 
the proper objects of control through sanction. But a crucial 
difference between their practical and moral personality remains. 
Practical personality is variable and contingent, whereas moral 
personality is unitary and categorical. People differ in their level of 
rationality and agency, and some display such capacities only 
marginally or not at all. Similar variation occurs intra-personally as 
well; the capacities in question fluctuate, and are occasionally 
extinguished, as during sleep or a coma. These variations impact 
the appropriateness of sanctions. But none of this affects the 
person’s dignity and the respect it mandates. To be sure, the 
apposite manifestation of respect is sensitive to a person’s state and 
capacities. For example, though respect ordinarily requires 
deference to a person’s self-regarding choices, this requirement is 
moot in the case of someone who can’t make any. But whatever 
the requisite manifestation of respect, the underlying value, 
dignity, is possessed by all human beings fully, equally, and 
uninterruptedly.33 
The implications of this picture for the question at hand are 
clear. If deontological constraints in general, and those of the 
criminal law in particular, are tied to human dignity, the possibility 
that they should extend to corporations, seen as entities in their 
own right, is foreclosed from the start.34 Moreover, this conclusion 
is consistent with ascribing to the corporation, on the basis of 
observation and study, a practical personality, sufficient to justify 
                                                          
33 It may be felt that tying the notion of moral personality to the possession 
of dignity commits us to an overly individualistic moral outlook. But how 
individualistic the outlook is depends on the conception of human beings we 
espouse, and in particular on the role of various collective affiliations in fixing 
their identities. Exploring the difficult issues that this raises lies outside the 
present topic. 
34 This does not suggest, of course, that the government’s power over 
corporations is unlimited. The point is only that such limitations as do apply 
must have a consequentialist, perhaps utilitarian basis, and at any rate cannot be 
extended wholesale and as a matter of course from the individual-oriented 
arrangements of ordinary criminal law. 
 Sanctioning Corporations 35 
the sanctioning of corporations in order to enforce desirable norms 
of conduct and improve corporate performance. 
B. Effects on Members 
But even if corporations are not identical with or reducible to 
the aggregate of their individual members, sanctioning 
corporations will have predictably negative effects on their 
members, whether shareholders or other stakeholders. Does not 
sanctioning the corporation amount to sanctioning the members as 
well, thus reinstating on the members’ behalf the need for the 
battery of side-constraints that punishing individuals requires? 
True, the nominal defendant in a corporate criminal trial is the 
corporation, rather than any designated individuals. But isn’t 
ignoring the individual ramifications of the sanction to take this 
formality way too seriously, and to ascribe to the corporate veil 
magical powers?  
To respond to these worries, we need to place them within a 
wider context by probing a bit further our earlier account of 
punishment. We saw that the imposition of sanctions threatens 
human dignity, and so calls for a particularly stringent battery of 
constraints. But why exactly is this the case? What precisely is it 
about criminal sanctions that provokes this anxiety and this 
response? A simple answer fixes on the obvious: criminal 
sanctions involve severe deprivations of people and a serious 
setback to their interests. Unless justified in a way consonant with 
the defendants’ moral standing as ends in themselves, such 
deprivations are morally reprehensible. But a moment’s reflection 
reveals the inadequacy of this simple answer. Two puzzles are 
particularly relevant. First, many other governmental practices—
taxation, civil damages, military conscription, and fiscal policy—
often involve similar deprivations, and yet none of them is as 
morally traumatic as the practice of punishment, nor are they 
restricted by a corresponding armory of constraints. The second 
puzzle concerns the way the effects of the sanctions themselves are 
assessed. Punishment frequently has negative ramifications that go 
beyond the particular defendant, impacting, sometimes severely, 
the defendant’s family and others. Nevertheless, the law draws a 
sharp line between the effects of punishment on the defendant and 
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its effects on other parties. While going to extraordinary length to 
safeguard that the defendant is indeed guilty of the crime charged, 
the law condones with near equanimity any indirect harm to other 
innocent parties. 
 The Argument from Stigma 
If the simple answer does not adequately explain the special 
solicitude toward criminal sanctions, what does? I consider two 
alternatives. According to the first, a distinguishing mark of 
criminal punishment is its link to moral turpitude and so to 
stigma.35 The main point of criminal law’s special safeguards is 
accordingly to protect individuals against an unwarranted 
stigmatization, and so against a particularly invidious insult to their 
dignity. If sound, this answer solves both puzzles: it explains the 
greater moral concern with punishment over other modes of 
governmental deprivation which do not carry such invidious 
implications, as well as the almost exclusive focus on the 
sanction’s effects on the defendant. This answer also upholds the 
conclusion that sanctioning corporations need not be attended by 
criminal law’s usual constraints, since it involves the 
stigmatization of no particular individual, and so threatens no one’s 
dignity. 
The argument from stigma seems to me right as far as it goes, 
but for our purposes it does not go far enough, for two reasons. 
First, not all criminal punishment need involve stigma. For 
example, it is at least debatable whether all mala prohibita offenses 
stigmatize. And governments may seek to enforce unjustifiable 
norms whose violation need not be associated with moral turpitude 
of any kind. Yet surely such employments of criminal sanctions do 
not exempt their users from the strictures that bind them in the case 
of more paradigmatic crimes. Second, for present purposes, the 
answer under consideration focuses on the wrong aspect of the 
                                                          
35 See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in 
DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 98 
(1970); Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal 
Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 437 
(1963) (“The central distinguishing aspect of the criminal sanction appears to be 
the stigmatization of the morally culpable.”). 
 Sanctioning Corporations 37 
criminal trial. Strictly speaking, the sanction itself does not 
stigmatize. Stigma attaches to the defendant by virtue of the 
conviction, the official pronouncement of guilt. If stigma were the 
main concern, it would appear that criminal law’s constraints 
would remain unaffected even in the absence of any sanction 
following conviction. At least within the present understanding of 
criminal law, this is not a plausible conclusion to reach. 
 The Argument from Mistreatment 
These considerations require that we move beyond stigma, and 
consider a second alternative. Since stigma depends on the content 
of the norms whose alleged violation is the basis for the sanction, 
in moving beyond stigma we must detach the special moral 
concern raised by criminal sanctions from the norms which the 
sanctions are designed to enforce. The aim is to reveal some formal 
characteristics of criminal sanctions that explain their special moral 
significance and so the constraints to which they are subject. My 
suggestion is that punishment is an instance of a kind of 
deprivation I call mistreatment, and that deprivations of this kind 
carry a particularly heavy moral weight. By mistreatment I mean a 
deliberate singling out of an individual for the sake of a severe 
deprivation.36 In the remainder of this section I clarify and 
substantiate three claims: that criminal sanctions ordinarily exhibit 
these characteristics to a high degree; that this accounts for the 
law’s special solicitude and the rigid constraints; and that 
sanctioning corporations, though likely resulting in some 
deprivations being inflicted on individuals, does not involve these 
individuals’ mistreatment, and so ought to be exempt from the 
constraints. 
It is easy to see that unlike other deprivations wrought by 
government action, criminal punishment presents an unambiguous 
                                                          
36 All the elements in this definition are continua and can come in various 
versions and in different degrees. In particular, one can “single out” in the 
relevant sense a group of individuals, when one targets an identity-fixing, e.g., 
ethnic or racial, property common to its members. It is significant therefore that 
membership in a corporation (as, say, that of its shareholders) is not identity-
fixing, nor is the membership defined in terms of some other identity-fixing 
characteristic.    
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case of mistreatment. The deleterious effects of a fiscal policy on 
employment, for example, can be accidental and unforeseen, 
whereas the deprivation involved in punishment is the product of a 
prolonged process of deliberation. Unlike taxation, which usually 
affects anonymous groups of individuals in an impersonal way, 
punishment focuses on a particular defendant, singling her out for 
a severe deprivation. Unlike quarantine, which may in principle be 
conducted in a five-star hotel, deprivation is the acknowledged 
purpose of punishment, not just a regrettable side-effect. Finally, 
criminal punishment involves particularly harsh deprivations. In 
noting this last feature, it is also noteworthy how this harshness is 
commonly assessed. The perception that punishment involves 
severe deprivations does not depend on its aggregate but rather on 
its distributive effects. If we were to assess the harshness of capital 
punishment, for instance, in aggregate terms and rank it among the 
various causes of death, it would probably not be of such great 
social and political moment; the number of people who actually die 
by execution is, statistically speaking, quite small. This fact does 
not, however, diminish our concern with capital punishment, since 
we deem it the most severe deprivation imposed on a particular 
individual. Here too there is a contrast with the way other forms of 
governmental deprivation are evaluated, e.g., the increase in road 
fatalities when, say, the speed limit is raised. 
But why does it matter that punishment fits my definition of 
mistreatment? Why do the various elements conjoined in this 
notion cohere, aggravating the negative moral significance of a 
deprivation that exhibits them? Start by noting that this 
combination of factors is not unique to criminal punishment, and 
so is not ad hoc; rather, these factors characterize serious criminal 
offenses as well. Consider first-degree murder. Its heinousness is 
based in the first place on the judgment that it involves the 
infliction of a most grievous deprivation. Note also that this 
judgment looks exclusively at the effects on the victim. In placing 
murder above, say, robbery, and at the top of the severity list, we 
do not take into account the incidence of the two crimes to 
determine which is more socially harmful in the aggregate; we 
compare only the two felonies’ distributive effects. Furthermore, 
the murderer targets an individual victim, whose death must be the 
offender’s conscious objective rather than just a foreseeable side-
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effect of her action; and the action must be the product of 
“premeditation and deliberation,” which marks it as more 
reprehensible than, say, reckless killing. In short, first-degree 
murder (and to a varying degree other core crimes) is an instance 
of mistreatment; our moral intuitions and the law’s attitude are 
aligned with the factors I have listed. Why?  
The answer I propose links up with the Kantian themes I 
pursued before. Morality, and correspondingly criminal law, insist 
that our behavior express due respect for each person’s supreme 
moral worth.37 The various elements of mistreatment provide 
criteria for judging the extent to which behavior fails to be 
respectful of the other and instead conveys reprehensible disregard. 
By inflicting a severe deprivation on a particular individual one 
exhibits a lack of respect for her. By judging the severity of the 
deprivation exclusively in terms of the effects on the victim rather 
than in aggregate societal terms we signal our commitment to the 
unique value of the individual and her incomparable worth.38 
Making the destruction of the other’s interests one’s affirmative 
goal is the epitome of disrespect: one enacts a conception of the 
victim as a mere means, someone whose own rights and interests 
can be trampled at will.39 And by doing all of this deliberately, one 
                                                          
37 Cf. Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 123, 133 
(1972):  
The view that it can be wrong to consider merely the overall effect of 
one’s actions on the general welfare comes into prominence when those 
actions involve relations with others. A man’s acts usually affect more 
people than he deals with directly, and those effects must naturally be 
considered in his decisions. But if there are special principles governing 
the manner in which he should treat people, that will require special 
attention to the particular persons toward whom the act is directed, 
rather than just to its total effect. 
38 In stark contrast with utilitarianism’s summation of effects on 
individuals, out of a concern for the sum total of such effects. See, e.g., 
CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 33–34 (1978); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 22–27 (1971). 
39 The distinction between the intended results and the unintended side-
effects of one’s actions has a long pedigree in Western moral philosophy, 
leading back to the Catholic doctrine of double effect. See, e.g., T.A. 
CAVANAUGH, DOUBLE-EFFECT REASONING: DOING GOOD AND AVOIDING EVIL 
(2006); THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT: PHILOSOPHERS DEBATE A 
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invests one’s actions with their full negative meaning, leaving no 
room for doubt about the disrespectful attitude they convey.40 
As these comments suggest, the formal characteristics of 
criminal sanctions parallel the formal characteristics of crime. 
Deliberately singling out a particular individual for the sake of 
inflicting on her a severe deprivation is a grave moral matter. 
Classifying sanctions as a case of mistreatment thus helps us 
appreciate the moral anxiety they produce. This account provides a 
straightforward answer to the puzzles regarding punishment we 
have raised, concerning the law’s greater solicitude toward 
criminal sanctions compared to other forms of government 
generated deprivations, and the law’s radically different attitude 
toward the sanction’s effects on the defendant as against its effects 
on other parties. Being a form of mistreatment, criminal sanctions 
pose a greater threat to human dignity than other deprivations, and 
the person whose dignity is thus at stake is the defendant on whom 
the sanction is visited, not anyone else. The battery of constraints 
created by criminal law is designed to mitigate this threat by 
ensuring, as much as possible, that the defendant is justly treated 
rather than being the victim of the equivalent of a crime.41 
                                                          
CONTROVERSIAL MORAL PRINCIPLE (P.A. Woodward ed., 2001). 
40 The interpretation of first degree murder, and by extension of other core 
criminal offenses, as instances of mistreatment, implies that blameworthiness is 
here intrinsic to what the law aims to prevent, and not just an external constraint. 
See generally Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretive 
Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 
1371 (1986). This suggests an additional fault line within criminal law as 
presently practiced (a fault line roughly corresponding to the distinction between 
mala in se and mala prohibita offenses) which separates offenses rooted in a 
moral concern to secure human dignity from those rooted in the imperatives of 
governance in a modern society. That a given level of blameworthiness is 
intrinsic to the wrong sought to be prevented by core offenses does not however 
entail that the same level of blameworthiness must be required for conviction: 
for purposes of deterrence, the law may cast a wider net. So even here, 
refraining from doing so, and insisting on a robust requirement of guilt, 
represents considerations associated with deontological constraints. 
41 Courts are sometimes required to decide whether a form of government 
deprivation not explicitly labeled as punishment is in fact punitive and so subject 
to criminal law’s strictures. For example, in concluding that the revocation of 
citizenship is indeed punitive, the criteria enumerated by the Supreme Court 
include: 
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The remaining step to our destination is short. Punishing the 
corporation involves no one’s mistreatment. None of the 
shareholders or other stakeholders who are made worse off by the 
corporate sanction is personally singled out for a deliberate 
deprivation. Consequently, the effects of corporate sanctions on 
shareholders and other individuals do not carry the invidious 
message of disrespect that mistreating them would have. For this 
reason, the corporate veil not only hides but morally shelters 
individuals from the effects of corporate punishment. The resulting 
individual deprivations must, of course, be taken into account in 
designing the system of corporate criminal liability. But the role 
that these side-effects should play in our deliberations lacks the 
special urgency present when the mistreatment of individuals is at 
stake. 
IV. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS 
Nothing I have said in this paper bears on the desirable level of 
government control of corporate behavior or on the best means of 
exercising such control. I have made two related, but different 
points. One is that the corporation is a suitable object for the 
                                                          
[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, 
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it 
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will 
promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and 
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, 
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected 
is assignable for it . . . . 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963). (For a slight 
variation of these criteria, see Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361–63 
(1997)). Some of the Court’s criteria correspond to elements in my notion of 
mistreatment. Where the two sets of criteria diverge, some doubts about the 
Court’s criteria come to mind, e.g., whether the deprivation has historically been 
regarded as a punishment appears uninformative (why was it so regarded in the 
first place?), and whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter has 
things backward (if it is punitive it better be based on a finding of scienter, 
rather than the other way round). In any case, the notion of mistreatment gives 
the determination of punitiveness a unified theoretical basis in a way that the 
Court’s criteria do not. 
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imposition of sanctions.42 Second, insofar as the imposition of 
sanctions is deemed desirable, it need not be hampered by the same 
constraints as those that tie the government’s hands when dealing 
directly with individuals. This dual conclusion has wider 
repercussions, within criminal law and beyond. Let me end by 
briefly indicating what they are.  
The further repercussion relating to criminal law was 
foreshadowed earlier in the paper when I mentioned various ways 
other than the distinction between sanction and constraint in which 
criminal law can be disaggregated. This implies potentially 
additional ways in which the treatment of corporations within what 
we broadly conceive as the criminal law can be custom tailored to 
suit them in distinction from the treatment due to individuals. 
Exploring these possibilities might eventually lead to a two-track 
system, with the tracks differing along the substantive, procedural, 
and evidentiary dimensions. These tracks need not, however, end 
at the boundary of criminal law. The considerations that shape 
them pertain to other legal areas as well, suggesting a two-track 
legal system throughout.43 Though some steps in this direction 
have already been taken, they are spotty and sporadic.44 The 
present climate of heightened awareness toward corporations and 
their social role perhaps offers an opportunity for a more open-
minded and resolute willingness to rethink the law’s attitude 
toward them across the board, and contemplate the intellectual and 
                                                          
42 This does not of course tell us when, if ever, the imposition of sanctions 
is warranted, or how it compares with other strategies of control. 
43 For an early precursor of a line of thought pointing in this general 
direction, see generally CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE 
SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975). 
44 For example, numerous laws tie various special obligations to corporate 
size. See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601–
2654 (West 2010) (tying the right to take a leave of absence to care for certain 
family members to employees of corporations with fifty or more employees); 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 2009) (limiting the Act’s 
prohibition on employment discrimination to companies that employ fifteen or 
more employees); cf. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 
Stat. 745 (West 2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) 
(imposing disclosure and auditing requirements upon publicly traded 
corporations). 
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institutional transformations that might be required.45 
Finally, the considerations canvassed in this paper stand for an 
even broader claim, that the corporate economy opens up an area 
in which the government has greater moral leeway than when its 
coercive power is brought to bear directly on individuals. 
Interposing an intermediate entity between the government and its 
citizens blunts some of the moral edge of coercion and mitigates 
the threat it otherwise poses to individuals’ dignity and their 
autonomy. This has two complementary implications. One is that 
in dealing with corporations, the government may legitimately 
pursue social goals more aggressively than when dealing with 
individuals.46 The second implication is that the greater moral 
license the government enjoys in regard to corporations may 
bolster the government’s circumspection in regard to individuals. 
The underlying suggestion is that whenever feasible, and other 
things being equal,47 the government shift its coercive powers from 
individuals to corporations, letting the latter serve as the preferred 
vehicles for attaining its policy objectives. Shifting in this way the 
brunt of government action from individuals to corporations may 
provide a way of promoting the social interest with a reduced 
moral toll. 
 
                                                          
45 However, the suggested approach has recently suffered a severe setback 
in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 912–13 (2010), in 
which the Supreme Court reversed previous decisions that had limited corporate 
First Amendment protections. I address some of these broader issues in MEIR 
DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR 
BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986). 
46 But here again, moral license is one thing; sound policy that is consonant 
with it is another. How active the government should be in its dealings with 
corporations and what forms that activity should take are distinctly policy 
matters which lie entirely outside my present discussion. 
47 Which of course they never are; so this proposal is put forward not as a 
program for action, but as food for reflection. 
